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file on MySpace.com (“MySpace”1) of the principal of Hickory High
School.2 The profile characterized the principal as a drug-using alcoholic.3
Justin was suspended for ten days.4 Similarly, in 2007, J.S., a fourteenyear-old eighth grade student at Blue Mountain Middle School in Orwigsburg, Pennsylvania, logged onto her household computer and created a fictitious MySpace profile of her principal.5 This profile characterized the
principal as a bisexual sex addict.6 J.S. was suspended for ten days.7 Both
students brought cases against their school districts. While the facts of both
cases are almost identical, the Third Circuit issued opposite holdings, one
in favor of the student and the other in favor of the school district.8
This intra-circuit split is likely due to a lack of guidance from the United
States Supreme Court on the issue of when school officials may punish
students for Internet speech created on a student’s home computer. The
standard utilized in most student speech cases was established in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,9 a case decided in
1969, prior to the invention of the Internet. In Tinker, a group of students
sued their school district after being suspended for wearing black armbands
in protest of the Vietnam War.10 The Supreme Court held that “where
there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot
be sustained.”11 In dicta, the Court further stated that a school may be able
to punish student speech if, in the absence of a substantial disruption, the
record demonstrates “any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with

1. MySpace is a popular social networking Internet site where users can share photos,
music, personal interests, and the like with other Internet users. See MYSPACE, http://www.
myspace.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
2. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
3. See id. The profile stated that the principal was “too drunk to remember” the date of
his birthday, and stated that the principal had smoked a “big blunt” in the past month. Id.
4. Id. at 593.
5. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en
banc granted No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 3, 2010).
6. See id. at 291.
7. See id. at 293.
8. Compare Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (in favor of student), with Snyder, 593
F.3d at 308 (in favor of school district). These cases were reheard en banc and a Third Circuit opinion is pending.
9. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
10. See id.
11. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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school activities.”12 The standard established in Tinker is vague, in that
courts are unclear as to when the test should apply and how much discretion should be given to a school official’s decision to discipline. In addition, having been established prior to Internet speech, the standard is outdated. Courts are now left with the difficult task of applying the already
murky Tinker standard to the modern context of the Internet. More specifically, they must address this question: When does school discipline cross
the line from merely punishing speech that the school disagrees with, to
punishing speech that the school foresees would cause a substantial disruption to the school environment?
The Internet is a unique communication device, creating a dilemma for
both the schools and the district courts that adjudicate speech cases involving the Internet. Unlike tangible forms of communication, such as newspapers, speech made on the Internet is boundary-less,13 and pinpointing the
location of its occurrence is not easily accomplished. Therefore, when
speech occurs via the Internet and concerns a school official, it is often difficult to determine an applicable standard. In these cases, lower courts
have struggled to apply the Tinker dicta.
In the cases utilizing Tinker, most courts have broken the inquiry down
into two prongs. The first prong of the student speech inquiry asks whether
the speech can be characterized as having occurred on or off campus. Student speech is afforded full First Amendment protection when it occurs off
campus, but only limited First Amendment protection when it occurs on
school grounds.14 Examples of off campus speech include a drawing done
by a student in his home with no intention of bringing the drawing to
school,15 and an underground newspaper sold off campus.16 If the speech
is off campus, and is therefore afforded full First Amendment protection,
punishment by the school district for such speech is prohibited. If the
speech is on campus, and therefore does not have complete First Amendment protection, the analysis continues to the second prong. The second
prong of the student speech inquiry asks whether the on campus student
speech has caused, or whether the school can reasonably forecast that it
will cause, a substantial disruption to the school environment.

12. Id. at 514.
13. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357
(2003).
14. Benjamin F. Heidlage, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 573-74 (2009).
15. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004).
16. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979).
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While the above analysis may work for tangible speech that does not
take place over the Internet and, therefore, has a pinpointed location, for
cases involving Internet speech, the analysis is akin to trying to fit a round
peg into a square hole. Traditionally, on campus speech included only
speech that took place on school grounds during school hours.17 Therefore,
some lower courts have mischaracterized the Internet speech issue as one
of geography, and in determining whether the speech occurred on or off
campus, have focused on whether the speech was made over the student’s
computer, at the student’s home.18 Focusing on the location of the Internet
speech is futile, given the distinct nature of online speech.19
This Note proposes a new standard for student speech cases involving
Internet speech.20 Due to the unique characteristics of the Internet, I suggest eliminating the first prong of the analysis that asks whether the speech
is on or off campus, and concentrating instead on the impact of the online
speech. The proposed standard would refine Tinker’s forecast of the substantial disruption test by incorporating the factors of whether the likelihood of disruption is high and whether the type of disruption poses severe
harm to the school environment. This Note will focus on whether and
when a school district may discipline a student for creating a parody profile
of a school official on an off campus computer when the speech does not
disrupt the school environment.
Part I of this Note provides an historical summary of student speech and
the First Amendment. Part I.A discusses the history of the First Amendment. Part I.B discusses the Supreme Court cases involving student
speech. This Part provides a background for subsequent lower court decisions. Part II examines the current conflict in the lower courts and looks at
how these courts have approached the issue of when schools may discipline
speech where disruption did not result. This Part will analyze the approach
taken by courts in cases dealing with tangible, off campus speech, such as
newspaper speech, and in cases dealing with Internet speech. Part II.A analyzes non-Internet speech that does not have a substantial disruption on the
school environment. Part II.B analyzes cases concerning online student
speech. Part III argues that courts should shift their focus away from strict-

17. Heidlage, supra note 14, at 573.
18. See id. at 574-75.
19. See discussion infra Part I.C.
20. This Note focuses on how a court should analyze the issue of whether a school can
reasonably forecast substantial disruption. This issue is part of a larger debate as to whether
student Internet speech conducted outside of school is afforded full First Amendment protection. For purposes of this Note, cases with proven disruption are set aside, although the
task of setting aside such cases is not always easy, because the issue of whether disruption is
substantial enough to warrant school discipline remains at play.
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ly applying the Tinker standard, and toward the adoption of a new rule that
is more applicable to cases involving the Internet. The new standard states
that a school may punish a student for his or her speech only if the type of
speech poses great harm to the school environment and the likelihood that
such speech will result in substantial disruption is great. This proposed test
sets a higher bar for schools in their ability to punish student speech, and
therefore avoids a chilling effect on students’ First Amendment right to free
speech.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE INTERNET, AND THE SUPREME
COURT’S LIMITED JURISPRUDENCE ON STUDENT SPEECH
A.

The First Amendment

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”21 The heart of this Amendment has been
described as the “ineluctable relationship between the free flow of information and a self-governing people.”22 Protection of free expression exists to
encourage the free exchange and dissemination of ideas.23 The benefits society reaps from the unrestricted flow of ideas outweigh the costs society
endures by receiving deplorable ideas. Generally, courts have zealously
guarded the right to free speech.
Nevertheless, this right is not absolute. For example, certain types of
speech can be regulated if they are likely to inflict unacceptable harm.
These narrow categories of unprotected speech include “fighting words,”24
speech that incites others to imminent lawless action,25 obscene speech,26
defamatory speech,27 and “true threats.”28

21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
23. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (“Open debate and
discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public questions there should
be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269-70 (1964).
24. See, e.g., Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942) (holding that
speech directed at another that is likely to provoke violence is unprotected).
25. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
26. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”).
27. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 283 (1964) (awarding damages for defamation of public official if statement was made with actual malice).
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The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Student Speech

The Supreme Court has provided minimal guidance to lower courts regarding when a public school student’s First Amendment right to free
speech prevails.29 The three decisions on this matter provide standards that
cannot be properly applied to student online speech.30 Nonetheless, an introduction to the Supreme Court precedent provides a useful backdrop to
better understand the lower courts’ attempts to analyze the issue of whether
student online speech may be disciplined by the school.
In Tinker, a group of students in Des Moines, Iowa were suspended for
wearing black arm bands to school to publicize their opposition to the
Vietnam War. The students brought an action against the school district for
violation of the First Amendment. In its majority opinion, the Supreme
Court famously stated: “It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.”31 The Court held that prohibition of expression
will not be justified where “there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.’”32 However, the Court limited the school’s right to discipline by
stating that punishment must not be predicated merely on the desire “to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpo-

28. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (stating that true threats are
not constitutionally protected speech).
29. The First Amendment protects against prohibition of speech by government actors
only. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985) (stating that in carrying out
disciplinary functions, schools act as representatives of the State); see also W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects citizens “against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not
excepted”).
30. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding a school may discipline a
student when the student’s speech advocates illegal drug use); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding lewd and vulgar student speech is not protected
by First Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1969) (holding school district violated students’ First Amendment right to free speech
when it suspended students for wearing black armbands to school in protest of Vietnam
War). A fourth case concerning student speech was decided by the Supreme Court. However, the case is not relevant for purposes of this Note. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Hazelwood concerned whether a school-sponsored newspaper
was subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection. See id. at 262. This Note is not
concerned with non-Internet speech that is demonstrably on campus or school sponsored.
31. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
32. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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pular viewpoint.”33 Instead, the prohibition must be based on “the special
characteristics of the school environment.”34 The Court held that the students’ black arm bands neither created, nor posed a risk of, substantial disruption to the school environment.35
It is noteworthy that the Court referenced various factors that essentially
define what constitutes a substantial disruption. The Court considered the
fact that the expression was unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance
on the part of the students, the lack of evidence of petitioners’ interference
with the school’s work, the fact that no class was interrupted, and the fact
that no threats or acts of violence occurred on school grounds.36 Due to the
absence of the above factors, the Court found a lack of evidence to support
the prediction of substantial disruption or material interference with the
school’s activities.37
Tinker puts great emphasis on the special characteristics of a school.38
While the Court did not limit its opinion to the confines of the classroom,
the Tinker opinion deals only with on campus speech. Because the
school’s dedication to its students does not end once the student leaves the
classroom, the Court reasoned that a student’s rights continue to apply
when he is in the cafeteria, on the playing field, or on campus during authorized hours.39 However, the Court did not extend this reasoning outside of
the schoolhouse gates. Due to the on campus limit of Tinker, the decision
provides minimal guidance as to when or whether a student may be punished by a school for off campus speech.
The next student speech case that the Supreme Court decided was Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.40 In this case, a student was punished by
his school for using a sexually explicit metaphor to discuss his friend’s
candidacy for student counsel in a speech at a school assembly.41 The
Court balanced “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms” against “society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate be-

33. Id. “Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take this risk . . . .” Id. at 508.
34. Id. at 506.
35. Id. at 514.
36. Id. at 508.
37. Id. at 514.
38. Id. at 506.
39. Id. at 512-13.
40. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
41. See id. at 677-78.
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havior.”42 The Court deviated from the Tinker test and implied that the
mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute. Instead, the Court held
that “it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms.”43 Under this lewd and vulgar
standard, the Court found that the First Amendment did not prohibit the
school from disciplining a student’s sexually explicit speech at a school assembly.44 The Court reasoned that the school stands in loco parentis to the
students, and therefore has an obligation to protect students from such
speech.45
In its analysis, the Court focused on the substance of the speech in conjunction with the location of its delivery. Unlike the armbands worn in
Tinker, the inappropriate speech in Fraser was unrelated to any political
position.46 Moreover, the fact that such lewd and vulgar speech occurred at
a high school assembly, toward “an unsuspecting audience of teenage students,” weighed in favor of the Bethel School District.47
The most recent Supreme Court case regarding student speech is Morse
v. Frederick.48 In this case, the Court upheld the school’s suspension of a
student who held a banner during an off campus, school-sanctioned Olympic Torch viewing event that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”49 The Court
held that a school may discipline a student when the speech encourages illegal drug use, even if the speech does not cause a disruption and is not
made in a school-sponsored medium.50
Once again, the Supreme Court put great emphasis on the fact that the
school environment has special characteristics.51 While the speech was
technically off campus, it was made at a school-sponsored event, in the
presence of school administrators and teachers.52 The Court compared the
facts of Morse to the Fraser facts, and noted that if Fraser had delivered his
same speech outside of the school, in a public forum, it would have been

42. Id. at 681.
43. Id. at 683.
44. See id. at 686.
45. See id. at 684.
46. Id. at 685. The fundamental values of a democratic society must include tolerance
of opposing political views. Id. at 681.
47. Id. at 685 (“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit
monologue . . . .”).
48. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
49. See id. at 397.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 408.
52. Id. at 396-97.
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protected.53 The Court did not explicitly state that the holding was inapplicable to off campus speech.
While affirming the Tinker holding, the Supreme Court in Fraser and
Morse appears to be establishing exceptions to the substantial disruption
test, instead of further refining the test. The Court’s approach has provided
little, if any, guidance as to what constitutes a substantial disruption or a
reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption. Therefore, the lower courts
have no indication of whether and when schools have the authority to prohibit student online speech.
C.

The Internet

The Internet adds a complicated wrinkle to the student speech analysis
because it is not a tangible medium like a school newspaper. Lorna E. Gillies stated in the article, Addressing the “Cyberspace Fallacy”: Targeting
the Jurisdiction of an Electronic Consumer Contract, that “[c]yberspace
has been defined as ‘an on-line community,’”54 and has also been described
“more crudely as ‘neither here nor there.’”55 Orin Kerr explains that from
the viewpoint of virtual reality, the Internet is a separate space that is even
governed by a separate set of legal rules.56 From the viewpoint of physical
reality, Kerr explains, the Internet is viewed as a means of communication.57 Therefore, the Internet is both a separate space and a means of
communication.
This split persona embodied by the Internet makes it difficult for lower
courts to define the speech’s specific location. The inability to define a
specific location has made it difficult to decide whether to apply the Tinker
holding, which requires speech to be “on campus” in order to have limited
First Amendment protection, and therefore possibly be prohibited. But
whether a student is posting speech on the Internet at school or from his or
her home computer does not denote the location of the speech. This type of
speech occurs neither on nor off campus. It is speech on the Internet. “It’s
not where you throw the grenade, it’s where the grenade lands,” said An-

53. See id. at 405.
54. 16 INT’L. J.L. INFO. TECH. 242, 243 (2008) (citing Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts
on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 7882 (1996); A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY, http://www.isoc.org/internet/
history/brief.shtml).
55. Id. (quoting Diana J. P. McKenzie, Commerce on the Net: Surfing Through Cyberspace Without Getting Wet, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247, 267 (1996)).
56. See Kerr, supra note 13.
57. Id. at 360.
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thony Sanchez, a lawyer who represented the Hermitage School District.58
Once courts are able to understand the boundary-less location of Internet
speech, the applicability of Tinker becomes comprehensible.
Because the Internet is boundary-less, no communications technology of
the twentieth century presents as much opportunity for uninhibited expression as does the Internet.59 The far-reaching ability of the Internet significantly impacts the lives of students. Students utilize the Internet for both
recreational and educational purposes.60 For example, some teachers require Internet use in their classes by holding students accountable for materials distributed via email or utilizing various computerized educational
programs.61 Even if the Internet is not required in the classroom, it is an
important educational device outside of the classroom.62 With websites
such as Wikipedia.org and Encyclopedia.com, students have instant access
to a wealth of knowledge.
An example of students’ recreational use of the Internet is social networking. Social networking sites have three unique attributes that make
them more likely to have an impact on the school environment than tangible off campus speech: (1) the sites’ functions are gathered together in one
place; (2) the sites have millions of users and daily traffic; and (3) people
have quick and convenient access to everything that is posted.63 Facebook
claims to have more than five hundred million active users, with fifty percent logging onto Facebook on any given day.64 MySpace reports to have
about seventy million users.65 With the large amount of users on these social networking sites, information posted on the sites can spread like wild-

58. Clifford M. Marks, Free Speech in Question When Talking Out of School, WALL ST.
J., July 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704525704575341353771
603056.html.
59. Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The
First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1996).
60. See Garner K. Weng, Type No Evil: The Proper Latitude of Public Educational Institutions in Restricting Expressions of Their Students on the Internet, 20 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 751, 764-66 (1998). Weng describes how students use the Internet to socialize,
conduct research, gather news, shop, and play games. See id. at 763-66. Teachers at many
post-secondary schools, including law schools, are using the Internet to distribute information concerning classes and assignments and are also utilizing the Internet to communicate
with and instruct students. See id. at 763-64.
61. See id. at 763.
62. See id.
63. Michael J. O’Connor, School Speech in the Internet Age: Do Students Shed Their
Rights When They Pick Up a Mouse, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 459, 478 (2009).
64. Press Room Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?
statistics (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
65. Dawn C. Chmielewski, MySpace in Second Place Networking Site Continues to
Lose Ground to Facebook, STAR-LEDGER, June 18, 2009, at 29.
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fire. In addition, these sites allow people to post things that are “part diary,
part photo album, with gossip, favorite music, pet peeves—sometimes even
phone numbers and home addresses. And occasionally, revealing pictures.”66 People can even post their current location.67 In addition, users
can see personal information about their friends, family, and even complete
strangers.
While these sites have privacy settings, one can still access information
even with the privacy settings in place. On Facebook, the default privacy
settings allow anyone who attends the user’s school or is in the user’s network to view his or her posts.68 Networks include major cities and major
universities.69 Therefore, a user’s information is potentially available to
every person in the city in which he or she is living, and every person who
is currently attending or attended his or her university.70 Even if the settings are restricted, a user’s friends have access.71 Therefore, an inappropriate description of a school official can rapidly become the talk of the
school.
Facebook also created the “newsfeed” feature, which lists a user’s actions on a friend’s homepage, almost like a public announcement.72 As a
result, when a student writes on someone’s Facebook wall that the principal
is an alcoholic, not only does the person on whose wall it was written see
this information,73 but all of the student’s friends on Facebook see it as
well. Despite the instant access of the newsfeed feature, users complain
that they want access to more information, and at a faster rate.74 MySpace75 and Twitter76 have implemented newsfeed features as well.

66. Pete Williams, MySpace, Facebook Attract Online Predators, MSNBC (Feb. 3,
2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11165576/ns/nightly_news/.
67. J.D. Bierdsdorfer, Q & A: Crowding Out on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2008,
8:29 AM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/31/qa-crowding-out-on-facebook/.
68. O’Connor, supra note 63.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 478-79 (“When you post a picture you later regret, it is probably not comforting that it was ‘only’ available to the Philadelphia major metropolitan area or every Penn
State student and alum.”).
71. Id. at 479.
72. Id. at 480. When a user changes his or her profile picture, updates his or her status,
or writes a message on a friend’s wall, this information is posted on the newsfeed. Id.
73. The “wall” is a place to share content with other facebook users. See Help Center,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/? faq=13153&tq (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
74. Nick O’Neill, Facebook Needs a Faster Newsfeed, ALL FACEBOOK: THE UNOFFICIAL
FACEBOOK RESOURCE (Mar. 26, 2008, 5:18 PM), http://www.allfacebook.com/facebookneeds-a-faster-newsfeed-2008-03.
75. Robin Wauters, MySpace Launches New Set of APIs With Google, OneRiot and
Groovy, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 9, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/12/09/myspace-realtimeapi-google-oneriot-groovy/ (discussing how when a MySpace user posts content from
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Due to the unique characteristics of the Internet and its far-reaching influence on the everyday lives of students, online speech is more likely to
have a wider impact on the school environment than, for example, speech
in an underground newspaper. Therefore, courts are hesitant to find that
school officials are unable to discipline a student for online speech under
the First Amendment simply because the speech was not “on campus” in
the traditional sense.77 The Supreme Court has not decided a student
speech case concerning online speech, leaving lower courts with no guidance on how to address this inquiry.
II. LOWER COURTS’ ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS WHETHER SCHOOL
REASONABLY FORECASTED SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION78
Given the Supreme Court’s lack of direction on the school speech matter, the lower courts’ decisions lack any sense of uniformity. Lower courts
deciding whether a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption exists have examined several factors, including the connection between the
speech and the school, predictions of disruption, and the content of the
speech.
I begin this section with a discussion of cases concerning non-Internet
speech and examine whether the evidence in the cases supports a finding of
a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption to the school environment.
When the student posts the speech using an off campus computer, such Internet speech is not on campus in the traditional sense. Therefore, while
not the main subject of this Note, non-Internet speech provides a helpful
backdrop when first analyzing student Internet speech. Next, this Part will
discuss student Internet speech created on an off campus computer. Due to
the advent of the Internet, lower court opinions have shifted away from a
bright line standard according to which off campus speech is afforded full
First Amendment protection, to a broader approach not limited by the physanother site, it can go directly to his or her MySpace activity stream, creating a link back to
the third-party site).
76. Streaming API Documentation, TWITTER, http://dev.twitter.com/pages/streaming_
api (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (stating that there are three ways to stream information). The
Twitter newsfeed feature allows Twitter users to view public statuses from multiple users on
one page. Id.
77. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (2002)
(finding student speech made over a home computer constituted on campus speech because
circulation of the speech on school grounds was inevitable).
78. This Note will not be focusing on proven substantial disruption. Rather, this Note
will focus on school officials’ reasonable forecast of substantial disruption when no such
disruption has actually occurred. However, evidence of disruption to the school environment may be a factor in determining whether a reasonable risk of substantial disruption exists.
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ical characteristics of the speech. Under this approach, lower court opinions have made speech more susceptible to prohibition.
A.

Non-Internet Speech and Whether School Reasonably Forecasted
Substantial Disruption

While the purpose of this Note is to determine when a school district
may discipline student speech that was made over the Internet, outside of
school, the lower court cases dealing with non-Internet speech are a helpful
backdrop for understanding newer cases dealing with online speech. The
lower courts appear to be migrating away from a strict standard where off
campus speech is afforded full First Amendment protection and therefore
can never be disciplined, to Tinker’s dicta where speech may be disciplined, regardless of where the speech takes place, if it poses a reasonably
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the school environment.79 In
determining whether a school district was reasonable in forecasting a substantial disruption, lower courts consider the intent of the speaker and
whether actual disruption resulted. Nonetheless, the lower courts’ jurisprudence is disjointed as a result of an unclear and outdated standard for student speech cases.
1.

On Campus

In Chandler v. McMinnville School District,80 the Ninth Circuit found
that the passive expression of an opinion on a button did not pose a risk of
substantial disruption to the school environment. In this case, two students
wore buttons to school in support of a teacher strike.81 The vice principal
ordered the students to remove the buttons and suspended them for the remainder of the school day.82 The court found that the speech was not vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive, and therefore could not be analyzed under Fraser.83 Therefore, the court applied Tinker’s dicta, requiring
school officials to justify their decision to discipline by showing “facts
which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities.”84 The court
noted that the First Amendment does not require school officials to wait

79. I argue in this Note that the location of the speech is irrelevant. The impact of the
speech is what should be at issue.
80. 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).
81. Id. at 526.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 530.
84. Id. at 529 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969)).
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until disruption actually occurs because they in fact “have a duty to prevent
the occurrence of disturbances.”85 In deciding whether the evidence
showed a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption, the court considered
whether the speech was inherently disruptive and the fact that the speech
was directed at school faculty.86 The court found that while the buttons
displaying the word “scab” could be “interpreted as insulting, disrespectful
or even threatening,” such a passive expression is not the same as “those
activities which inherently distract students and break down the regimentation of the classroom.”87 The Court therefore held that the district court
erred in dismissing the complaint.88
In contrast, in B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District,89 the Eighth
Circuit found that a school’s ban of clothing that displayed the Confederate
flag was constitutionally permissible. In that case, two students were suspended from school for wearing clothing that displayed the Confederate
flag.90 In analyzing whether it was reasonable for the school officials to
suspect material and substantial disruption, the court focused on evidence
of actual disruptions related to the Confederate flag or race.91 These disruptions included an ongoing spat between Farmington High School and
neighboring Festus High School, in which two Farmington basketball players allegedly used racial slurs against two black Festus players in connection with the display of the Confederate flag outside the locker rooms, a
white student urinated on a black student, causing the black student to
withdraw from the school, and numerous other racial slurs were used and
swastikas drawn at the school.92 Based on these incidents, the court found
that the risk of substantial disruption related to the Confederate flag was
reasonably foreseeable.93
While the Eighth Circuit focused on evidence of actual disruption in the
B.W.A. case, the Fifth Circuit noted in A.M. v. Cash94 that Tinker does not
require a showing of past disruption to prove a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption. In this case, two girls were suspended for bringing bags
decorated with the Confederate flag to school. The court found that the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. (citing Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir.1973)).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 530-31 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966)).
Id. at 531.
554 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 736.
See id. at 739-40.
Id. at 739.
See id. at 741.
585 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009).
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“racial tension and hostility at the school justified defendants’ ban on visible displays of the Confederate flag” at school.95
The most recent case concerning on campus student speech that did not
result in substantial disruption is DeFabio v. East Hampton Union Free
School District.96 In this case, a rumor spread through East Hampton High
School that Daniel DeFabio, a tenth grade student at the school, made a
comment to a friend concerning another student’s ethnic background.97
DeFabio allegedly stated, “one down, forty thousand to go.”98 The student
community acted antagonistically toward DeFabio after the rumor spread.99
DeFabio’s mother asked the principal if DeFabio could read a declaration
of his innocence over the school’s public address system, or in the alternative, read the statement during a school assembly or have the school distribute the statement to the students in written form.100 The principal denied
all the requests due to the risk that any statement could ignite the current
tensions in the school.101
The court applied the Tinker standard, asking whether “the record . . .
demonstrate[s] . . . facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities.”102 In applying the Tinker standard, the court noted that the Supreme Court’s focus in Tinker was not on the actual content of the speech
but rather the “extent to which the speech would be accompanied by ‘disorder or disturbance.’”103 To determine whether the School District could
forecast disruption, the court considered the fact that actual disruption had
already occurred.104 The police were assigned to protect Daniel’s home,
Daniel had received death threats, and he had admitted that he was scared
to return to school.105 Therefore, the court found that it was not arbitrary or
irrational for the School District to forecast a substantial disruption of the
school environment if Daniel’s speech were allowed.106

95. Id. at 224.
96. 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010).
97. See id. at 74.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. While this case does not concern school discipline, the analysis utilized by the
Second Circuit is appropriate for purposes of this Note.
102. Id. at 78 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969)).
103. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
104. See id. at 79.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 82.
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Off Campus

One of the first cases after Tinker to address off campus speech that did
not result in substantial disruption was Thomas v. Board of Education.107
In that case, four students in Granville Junior-Senior High School in upstate New York produced a satirical publication, addressed to the school
community, containing articles concerning masturbation and prostitution.108 The publication was sold to classmates at the end of each school
day at a store in Granville.109 After the Board of Education president
learned of the paper from her son, she presented it to the school principal
and the students were disciplined.110 The Second Circuit adopted a strict
standard that focused primarily on the location of the speech.111 The court
stated: “Here, because school officials have ventured out of the school yard
and into the general community where the freedom accorded expression is
at its zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind
government officials in the public arena.”112
This strict standard was rationalized by the court under a test which balanced the individual’s First Amendment right against the school’s interest
in maintaining an appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.113
The individual’s interest includes avoiding a chilling effect on speech.114
The court reasoned that this country was built on the premise that expression must flourish and that this right applies to students.115 Therefore, the
Second Circuit found that any speech that took place off campus could not
be disciplined by the school.
While the court utilized a strict standard of no punishment for off campus speech, it did make mention of the substantial disruption test in its rejection of Judge Newman’s concurring opinion, which stated that school
officials may regulate allegedly “indecent” expression by students in the
general community.116 The court recognized that there could be a situation
in which students incite “substantial disruption within the school from

107. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
108. Id. at 1045.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1046.
111. See id. at 1050 (stating that the on campus activities were de minimis and therefore
properly deemed off campus).
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1049.
114. See id. at 1047, 1049 (stating that at the heart of the First Amendment is the inescapable relationship between the uninhibited flow of information and a self-governing people).
115. See id. at 1049 (stating that nowhere is unrestrained expression more vital than in
our nation’s schools).
116. See id. at 1053 n.18.
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some remote locale.”117 Nevertheless, the court did not address this scenario because no such disruption occurred in the case.118
The Second Circuit indirectly defined the substantial disruption test by
rejecting the possibility of discipline when the school can foresee that
speech will reach school grounds, without resulting in any actual disruption.119 The court supported the opinion that distribution of speech inside
the school does not amount to a substantial disruption, noting that an off
campus publication criticizing the school itself will inevitably reach campus.120 The court noted that this standard “invites school officials ‘to seize
upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for barring
the expression of unpopular views.’”121 Therefore, if courts adopted such a
standard, a school could essentially punish a student for watching an Xrated film at home or for purchasing a dirty magazine at a local store.122
Similarly, in Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board,123 the Fifth Circuit found that a student could not be disciplined for speech that took place
off campus, even though it was directed at the school principal.124 In this
case, a student drew a picture in his house of his school under siege, with
obscene remarks regarding his principal and a brick being thrown at the
principal.125 Two years later, the picture was brought to school by the student’s brother and shown to his bus driver.126 The Fifth Circuit stated that
the speech was “not on campus or even speech directed at the campus” because the drawing was completed at home, stored for two years, and not intended by the student to be brought into school.127
While the Second and Fifth Circuits did not adopt the substantial disruption standard established in Tinker, the Seventh Circuit utilized this test in
Boucher v. School Board.128 In this case, a junior at Greenfield High
School near Milwaukee wrote a piece in an underground newspaper created
117. Id. at 1052 n.17.
118. Id. (finding no substantial disruption because school officials did not take action for
six full days and only punished the students because the school board believed the publication was “morally offensive, indecent, and obscene,” not because of fear of disruption).
119. See id. at 1053 n.18 (stating that schools’ power to punish students for indecent expression is denied when they seek to punish off campus expression “simply because they
reasonably foresee that in-school distribution may result”).
120. See id.
121. Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)).
122. See id.
123. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
124. See id. at 618.
125. See id. at 611.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 615.
128. 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998).
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by students of Greenfield, in which he described how to hack into the
school’s computers.129 The underground newspaper, entitled The Last, was
distributed on campus.130 The court in this case found that “[u]nder existing case law . . . a reasonable forecast of disruption is all that would be required of the [School] Board” to make discipline appropriate.131 In analyzing whether the School Board reasonably forecasted a substantial
disruption resulting from the newspaper article, the court found that speech
instructing students how to hack into a school computer was a “call to action.”132 The court found that it was reasonable for the School Board to
forecast a risk of substantial disruption when the speech was a call for action.133
In 2008, the Sixth Circuit decided Lowery v. Euverard,134 which involved off campus student speech that did not result in a substantial disruption. In this case, four students on the Jefferson County High School football team in Tennessee created a petition that stated: “I hate Coach Euvard
[sic] and I don’t want to play for him.”135 Eighteen players signed the petition.136 The four students who created and distributed the petition were
kicked off the team.137
Plaintiffs argued that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment
because the petition did not substantially disrupt the team. Nevetheless, the
Sixth Circuit noted that “Tinker does not require school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn before closing the door. Nor does Tinker ‘require certainty that disruption will occur.’”138 To require a showing of actual disruption would put school officials between the “proverbial rock and
hard place: either they allow disruption to occur, or they are guilty of a
constitutional violation. Such a rule is not required by Tinker, and would
be disastrous public policy . . . .”139 Therefore, the court considered whether the speech posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption
to the school environment.140

129. See id. at 822.
130. Id. at 829.
131. Id. at 828.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
135. Id. at 585.
136. Id. at 586.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 591-92 (quoting Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir.
2006)).
139. Id. at 596.
140. See id. at 593.
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To determine whether it was reasonable for the school district to forecast
a risk of substantial disturbance to the school environment under Tinker,
the court considered the fact that the speech could break apart the team.141
The court found that empirical data was not needed,142 a common-sense
conclusion that there could reasonably be a substantial disruption would
suffice.143
Plaintiffs further argued that the petition was not disruptive because they
did not intend to present it to school officials until after the football season.144 However, the court found the intent of the speaker to be irrelevant
for purposes of determining whether the expression posed a risk of substantial disruption.
B.

Online Student Speech and Reasonable Forecast of Substantial
Disruption145
1.

Cases in Favor of the School

The most recent case involving student online speech where the court
held in favor of the school district is J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area
School District.146 In that case, an eighth grade student created a website
entitled “Teacher Sux,” on his home computer.147 This website consisted
of multiple web pages that made derogatory comments about the student’s
algebra teacher and the principal of his school.148 The student was expelled.149
Rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Tinker should be read narrowly to require an actual disruption, the court utilized the reasonable fear of disruption analysis.150 Under this analysis, the court stated that “while there must
be more than some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech,
complete chaos is not required for a school district to punish student
speech.”151 The court considered the actual disruption to the entire school

141. See id. (stating that abstract concepts like team morale and unity are not susceptible
to quantifiable measurement but have a large impact on a team).
142. See id. at 594.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 604.
145. This section will focus on the potential effect of Internet speech and not on the location where the speech is made.
146. 807 A.2d 847 (2002).
147. See id. at 850-51.
148. Id. at 851.
149. Id. at 853.
150. See id. at 856.
151. Id. at 868.
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community, including the students, teachers, and parents.152 The court
found that the “most significant disruption caused by the posting of the
website . . . was [the] direct and indirect impact of the emotional and physical injuries” to the teacher who was the target of the speech.153 The teacher
was unable to complete the school year and, due to stress and anxiety, took
a medical leave of absence the following year.154 The teacher’s absence for
over twenty days at the end of the school year required the use of three
substitute teachers.155 The court found that the use of multiple substitute
teachers “unquestionably disrupted the delivery of instruction to the students and adversely impacted the education environment.”156
In addition, “[c]ertain students expressed anxiety about the website and
for their safety. Students visited counselors.”157 The atmosphere of the
school was described “as if a student had died.”158 Parents also voiced
concern for school safety and questioned the adequacy of the substitute
teachers’ instruction.159 In sum, the court found that “the web site created
disorder and significantly and adversely impacted the delivery of instruction.”160
In LaVine v. Blaine School District,161 James LaVine, an eleventh grade
student at Blaine High School in Minnesota, wrote a poem about entering
the school and shooting twenty-eight people dead.162 James handed the
poem to his English teacher for her opinion.163 Several months earlier, a
student had shot and killed two students and injured twenty-five others at a
high school in Portland, Oregon.164 James’s school imposed an emergency
expulsion, believing that his presence posed a threat or danger to himself,
other students, or school personnel.165
In this case, the Ninth Circuit discerned three areas of student speech
and their governing standards. According to the court: “(1) vulgar, lewd,
obscene and plainly offensive speech is governed by Fraser; (2) school-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 869.
Id.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 853.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 983.
Id. at 984.
Id. at 984 n.2.
Id. at 985, 986 n.3.
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sponsored speech is governed by Hazelwood; and (3) speech that falls into
neither of these categories is governed by Tinker.”166 The court found that
James’s poem fell under the third category because it was not vulgar, lewd,
or obscene, nor was it sponsored by the school. In noting that Tinker does
not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before
taking action, the court adopted Tinker’s dicta, which states that discipline
against a student for his or her speech does not violate the First Amendment when the evidence shows that the school reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption resulting from the speech.167 In fact, the court noted that
Tinker does not require certainty that disruption will even occur; rather,
“the existence of facts which might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption” is sufficient.168
In its analysis of whether the school district showed facts that a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption existed, the court looked at the totality
of the relevant facts. The court looked not only to James’s actions but also
“to all of the circumstances confronting the school officials that might reasonably portend disruption.”169 It reasoned that school officials knew facts
that in isolation would probably not have warranted a response, but that in
combination might give school officials a reasonable basis for taking action.170 James had had previous suicidal intentions, had recently broken up
with his girlfriend (whom he was reportedly stalking), had several disciplinary problems in the past, and had been absent from school for three days
prior to handing in the poem.171 The poem itself “was filled with imagery
of violent death and suicide.”172 The court found that at the extreme it
could be interpreted as a warning of the shooting of James’s fellow students, and at a minimum as “a cry for help from a troubled teenager contemplating a suicide.”173 Considering James’s history, the content of the
poem itself, and the occurrence of actual school shootings, the court held
that “these circumstances were sufficient to have led school authorities reasonably to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities—specifically, that James was intending to inflict injury
upon himself or others.”174

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 988-89.
Id. at 989.
Id. (citing Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973)).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 989-90.
Id. at 990.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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In 2007, the Second Circuit also came down in favor of the school district in Wisniewski v. Board of Education.175 An eighth grade student at
Weedsport Middle School in upstate New York used AOL Instant Messaging (“IM”) software on his parents’ home computer.176 The student’s AOL
IM icon, which serves as an identifier of the sender, was a small drawing of
a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head with the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the student’s English teacher.177 The student sent IM messages
displaying the icon to approximately fifteen people.178 When the school
learned about the icon, it suspended the student for five days.179 In addition, the English teacher requested to stop teaching the student’s class.180
The court quickly dismissed the fact that the student posted the messages
from an off campus location, stating that the court has recognized that “offcampus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school.”181 To determine whether a substantial risk of disruption was
foreseeable, the court first analyzed the risk that the speech would come to
the attention of school authorities, and, second, whether it was reasonable
for the school officials to predict a substantial disruption to the school environment.182 The court was in agreement that it was reasonably foreseeable
that the IM icon would come to the attention of school authorities.183 In
addition, the court found that the “threatening content of the icon,” the “extensive distribution” of the content (fifteen people), and the time period for
which the speech was distributed (three weeks) all made the risk “foreseeable to a reasonable person.”184 Regarding whether it was reasonable for the
school officials to predict a substantial disruption to the school environment, the panel was divided as to whether the fact that the speech actually
did reach the campus obviates any analysis of whether such a disruption
was foreseeable.185 Nonetheless, the court found there to be no doubt that
once made known to the teacher and other school officials, the icon “would
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.”186 In conclusion, the court held that the IM icon crosses “the

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979)).
See id. at 39-40.
See id. at 39.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40 n.4.
Id. at 40.
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boundary of protected speech and constitutes student conduct that poses a
reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of
school authorities and that it would ‘materially and substantially disrupt the
work and discipline of the school.’”187
In 2008, the Second Circuit again decided in favor of a school district.
In Doninger v. Niehoff,188 Avery Doninger, a student at Lewis Mills High
School, brought a case against her school’s administration after she was
prohibited from running for Senior Class Secretary. After the school administration cancelled the battle-of-the-bands performance entitled “Jamfest,” Doninger posted a message on her publicly accessible blog that stated,
“Jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office . . . [a]nd here is a
letter my mom sent to Paula [Schwartz] and cc’d Karissa [Niehoff] to get
an idea of what to write if you want to write something or call her to piss
her off more. im [sic] down.”189 After the blog post, the school administration received numerous phone calls and email messages about Jamfest.190
During the two days following the post, school administrators Schwartz
and Niehoff missed or arrived late to several school-related activities.191
Noting that the Supreme Court has yet to address the scope of a school’s
authority to regulate speech that does not occur on school grounds or at a
school-sponsored event, the court nonetheless found that such speech may
be disciplined when the conduct “would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.”192 As a background to
help decide the novel issue of online speech, the court applied some of the
reasoning from Thomas. The Second Circuit noted the “need to draw a
clear line between student activity that ‘affects matters of legitimate concern to the school community,’ and activity that does not.”193 In addition,
the court used Judge Newman’s concurrence in Thomas arguing that “territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of

187. Id. at 38-39 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007)).
188. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
189. Id. at 45.
190. See id. at 44. Importantly, before the blog post, four student council members went
on a school computer and sent out a mass email requesting that the recipients contact the
district superintendent, Paula Schwartz, to urge that Jamfest be held as scheduled. See id.
The school administration received an overwhelming number of telephone calls and emails
from people concerning Jamfest. See id.
191. Id. at 46.
192. Id. at 48 (citing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40). It is noteworthy that the court rejected
the Fraser test because it is not clear whether Fraser applies to off campus speech. See id. at
49-50.
193. Id. at 48 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (1979)).
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[school administrators’] authority.”194 With these two points in mind, the
court then discussed the foreseeable risk of substantial disruption standard.
Utilizing the Wisniewski framework to determine whether the speech
would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption, the Second Circuit
again began by considering whether it was foreseeable that the off campus
expression would reach campus.195 When analyzing this first prong of the
analysis, the court considered the student’s intent, the content of the
speech, and the fact that the speech did reach school administrators.196 In
this case, Doninger’s intent was specifically “to encourage her fellow students to read and respond,” the speech directly pertained to school events,
and school administrators Schwartz and Niehoff saw the blog post.197
Therefore, the court concluded that it was foreseeable that the off campus
speech would reach campus.198
The court further found that the blog post “‘foreseeably create[d] a risk
of substantial disruption within the school environment.’”199 In analyzing
the foreseeable risk prong, the court considered three factors: the language
of the speech, the fact that the speech was misleading, and the type of discipline imposed.200 In terms of the language of the speech, Doninger’s post
included vulgar and “potentially incendiary language,” which the court determined to be evidence of a potential risk of disruption.201 For the second
factor of misleading speech, which the court found to be the most significant, the court directed its attention to Doninger’s post, which falsely stated
that Jamfest had been cancelled, while in reality the school administration
had offered the possibility of rescheduling the event.202 The court found
that Doninger disseminated this false information in order to direct more
calls and emails to the school administration.203 Given these circumstances, the court found that the speech “posed a substantial risk that [the
school] administrators . . . would be diverted from their core educational
responsibilities by the need to dissipate misguided anger or confusion over
Jamfest’s purported cancelation.”204

194. Id. at 48-49 (citing Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13).
195. See id. at 50.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d
Cir. 2007)).
200. See id. at 50-52.
201. See id. at 51.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 51-52.
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In analyzing the second factor, the court also considered the fact that the
disruption had already begun to occur.205 In refuting Doninger’s argument
that Tinker is not satisfied because the controversy at the school may have
resulted from the mass email created by the four student council members
and not Doninger’s blog post, the court utilized the Ninth Circuit’s elaboration in LaVine that “[t]he question is not whether there has been actual disruption, but whether the school officials ‘might reasonably portend disruption’ from the student expression at issue.”206
Lastly, the Court analyzed the third factor, namely, the relationship of
the school’s discipline to the student’s extracurricular role as a student government leader.207 The court noted that Doninger’s conduct “risked not only the disruption of efforts to settle the Jamfest dispute, but also frustration
of the proper operation of [the school’s] student government.”208 The court
found that Doninger’s speech undermined the values that student government is designed to promote, such as teaching good citizenship.209 Considering the cumulative effect of the three factors, the court held that Doninger’s post “created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work
and discipline of the school.”210
The next case concerning student online speech, in which the court held
in favor of the school district, was Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.211 J.S., an eighth grade honor student at Blue Mountain Middle
School in Pennsylvania, created a parody profile about her principal on
MySpace from her home computer.212 J.S. was suspended from school for
ten days.213 The case is currently before the Third Circuit for a rehearing
en banc. The court declined to decide whether a school official may discipline a student for lewd, vulgar, or offensive off campus speech that has
an effect on campus because the speech falls under Tinker.214
While the court utilized the general rule established in Tinker, it collapsed the two-prong test utilized in both Wisniewski215 and Doninger,216

205. See id. at 52 (stating that Doninger herself testified that students were “all riled up”
and that a sit-in was threatened).
206. Id. at 51 (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)).
207. See id. at 52.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 52.
210. Id. at 53.
211. 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 3,
2010).
212. See id. at 291. The profile referred to the principal as a “sex addict, fagass.” Id.
213. Id. at 293.
214. See id. at 298.
215. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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and instead simply analyzed whether the speech “created a significant
threat of substantial disruption in the Middle School.”217 Before delving
into the facts of the case, the court noted that school officials may not limit
student speech simply because of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,” but
that school officials also need not wait until a substantial disruption actually occurs.218 The court further refined the general Tinker standard by stating that “if a school can point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—especially one based on past incidents arising out of similar speech—
the restriction may pass constitutional muster.”219 Additionally, the court
noted that off campus speech that “reasonably threatens to cause a substantial disruption of or material interference with a school need not satisfy any
geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant to Tinker.”220
Considering these issues, the court defined the standard in this case to be a
balance between the exception based on substantial disruption on the one
hand, and the protected nature of off campus student speech on the other.221
In balancing the substantial disruption exception against the protected
nature of student off campus speech, the court considered the speech’s content, the target of the speech, the student’s intent, access to the speech, the
legality of the speech, and the actual disruption that resulted.222 Due to the
disturbing content of the speech, the court found the principal’s cause for
discipline was not simply a “petty desire” to suppress speech that criticized
him.223 The court was very influenced by the potential harm that the
speech posed to the principal, finding, for example, that the speech undermined the principal’s authority within the school.224 The principal testified
that he noticed a “severe deterioration in discipline in the Middle School,

216. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. In these cases, the courts first determined whether
the speech made its way onto campus due to its effect on the school, and then, only if this
factor was satisfied, examined whether the school district, in punishing the student for his or
her expression, infringed on the student’s First Amendment right. See Snyder, 593 F.3d at
298.
217. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298.
218. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Id. (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id. at 301.
221. Id. at 299.
222. See id. at 300.
223. Id. The profile contained comments such as “kidsrockmybed,” and the listed interests included “fucking in my office,” “hitting on students and their parents,” and “mainly
watch[ing] the playboy channel on directv.” Id. at 291.
224. Id. at 302.
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especially among the eighth graders,” following the publication and punishment.225 In addition, the court found that it was likely that parents
would begin questioning the principal’s conduct.226
The court took into account the fact that J.S. directly targeted the principal when he misappropriated the principal’s photograph from the school’s
website and inserted it into the fictitious MySpace profile.227 J.S.’s intent
was evidenced by the fact that she created the profile as a public means of
humiliation in the context of the principal’s role, and before those who
knew him in this context, and not merely as “a personal, private, or anonymous expression of frustration or anger.”228 This made it reasonable for
the school to predict a risk of substantial disruption.229 In addition, J.S.’s
intention to have the speech reach her school is evidenced by the fact that
she only allowed Blue Mountain School students to view the profile.230
The fact that the profile contained “potentially illegal” speech had no bearing on Tinker’s substantial disruption test.231 The court noted that the potential impact of the profile’s language alone was enough.232 Nonetheless,
the court found that a principal may regulate student speech “rising to this
level of vulgarity and containing such reckless and damaging information
as to undermine the principal’s authority within the school, and potentially
arouse suspicions among the school community about his character.”233
2.

Cases in Favor of the Student

In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District,234 a junior at Woodland
High School created an Internet homepage from his home computer, which
could be accessed by other Internet users. The homepage used vulgar language to criticize the teachers, principal, and the school’s own homepage.235 It also invited readers to contact the school principal to share their
opinions regarding the school, and contained a hyperlink directly to Woodland High School’s homepage.236 The student was suspended for ten

225. Id. at 294.
226. See id. at 301.
227. See id. at 300.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 300-01 (stating that at least twenty-two members of the school viewed the
profile within days).
231. Id. at 301-02.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 302.
234. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
235. See id. at 1177.
236. See id.
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days.237 Utilizing the Tinker test, the court found that “[w]hile speech may
be limited based upon a fear or projection of such disruption, that fear must
be ‘reasonable’ and not an ‘undifferentiated fear’ of a disturbance.”238 In
this case, the principal’s own testimony indicated that he disciplined the
student because he was upset by the content of the homepage, and not because of a fear of disruption or interference with school discipline.239 The
court held that “[d]isliking or being upset by the content of a student’s
speech is not an acceptable justification for limiting student speech under
Tinker.”240
In a subsequent case, Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415,241 a senior at Kentlake High School posted a web page on the Internet from his
home computer. The web page was entitled “Unofficial Kentlake High
Home Page,” and included commentary on the school’s administration and
faculty, as well as a section containing mock obituaries, where viewers
could vote on who should die next.242 The student was first put on emergency expulsion, which was later modified to a five day suspension.243 The
student moved for a temporary restraining order against the Kent School
District.244 Applying the Tinker and Fraser standards, the court looked to
the student’s intent, the content of the speech, and the actual disruption resulting from the speech.245 Finding no evidence that the student “intended
to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent
tendencies whatsoever,” the court enjoined the school from enforcing the
short-term suspension.246
One year later, the Western District of Pennsylvania decided Killion v.
Franklin Regional School District.247 In this case, a student at Franklin
Regional High School compiled a “Top Ten” list about the athletic director
that contained, inter alia, statements about the director’s appearance, including the size of his genitals.248 The student created the list on his home

237. See id. at 1179.
238. Id. at 1180 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508-09 (1969)).
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
242. Id. at 1089.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 1090.
246. See id.
247. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
248. See id. at 448.
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computer and then emailed it to his friends.249 After copies of the list were
found in the school and in the school’s teachers’ lounge, the student was
suspended for ten days.250 The court analyzed the online speech under
Tinker’s general standard because the “overwhelming weight of authority
has analyzed student speech (whether on or off campus) in accordance with
Tinker.”251
In response to the school district’s argument that it found the list to be
“rude, abusive and demeaning,” the court noted that while a “mere desire to
avoid discomfort or unpleasantness is not enough . . . if a school can point
to a well founded expectation of disruption—especially one based on past
incidents arising out of similar speech—the restriction may pass constitutional muster.”252 Although the school argued that the student had created
similar lists in the past, and had been warned that if he created such lists
again he would punished, it did not present any evidence that the student’s
earlier lists had caused a disruption.253 Therefore, the court found that the
events did “not support an expectation of disruption defense.”254
It is noteworthy that the court declined to apply Fraser’s lewd, vulgar, or
profane test to off campus online speech.255 In Fraser, Justice Brennan
noted in his concurring opinion that if the student “gave the same speech
outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.”256 Applying Justice Brennan’s comment to the facts in the Killion
case, the court found that while the top ten list contained multiple vulgarities,257 the relevant speech occurred within the student’s home and was not
connected with any school activity.258 Therefore, the court found that the
suspension violated the First Amendment.259
The next case that held student online speech could not be disciplined as
a result of the lack of evidence that a foreseeable risk of substantial disrup-

249. Id.
250. Id. at 448-49.
251. Id. at 455.
252. Id. (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
253. See id. at 455.
254. Id. at 456.
255. See id. at 456-57.
256. Id. at 456 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986)).
257. The site contained the statement: “[B]ecause of his extensive gut factor, the ‘man’
hasn’t seen his own penis in over a decade.” Id. at 457.
258. See id. at 456.
259. See id. at 458.
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tion existed was Layshock v. Hermitage School District.260 In this case,
Justin Layshock (“Justin”), a senior at Hickory High School, created a parody profile of his school’s principal on MySpace.261 Justin created the
profile on his grandmother’s computer, at her home, during non-school
hours.262 The profile contained a picture of the principal that Justin had
copied from the school’s website, and inappropriate descriptions of the
principal.263 During this time, three other parody profiles about the principal were created.264 Justin was suspended for ten days.265
Noting that the mere fact that the Internet may be accessed at school
does not suffice to authorize school officials to become “censors of the
world-wide web,” the court rejected a geographical test for online
speech.266 The court stated that, in the same way that “[t]he reach of school
administrators is not strictly limited to the school’s physical property . . . .
the mere presence of a student on school property does not trigger the
school’s authority.”267 Therefore, under Tinker, the court required the
school to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the speech and a fear of
substantial disruption of the school environment.268 The court held that the
“substantial disruption” standard could not be met through a “fear of future
disturbances.”269 The court found no evidence of fear of future disturbances because of Justin’s immediate suspension and the fact that school
was shut down for the holiday.270 In addition, the court noted that the
MySpace related sites had been successfully blocked from student
access.271 Due to the dearth in evidence of a substantial disruption or a fear
of future disturbances, the court held that the “[s]chool’s right to maintain

260. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
261. See id. at 591.
262. Id.
263. Id. In response to the question, “in the past month have you smoked?” the profile
says a “big blunt.” Id. In response to a question regarding alcohol use, the profile states “big
keg behind my desk.” Id. The profile also states that the principal is “too drunk to remember” the date of his birthday and that the principal is a “big steroid freak.” Id.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 593.
266. Id. at 598 (“It is clear that the test for school authority is not geographical.”).
267. Id.
268. Id. While the court found that under Fraser, lewd, sexually provocative student
speech may be banned without the need to prove that it would cause a substantial disruption
to the school learning environment, the court concluded that Fraser applied only to on campus speech. See id. at 599.
269. Id. at 601.
270. See id.
271. See id.
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an environment conducive to learning does not trump Justin’s First
Amendment right to freedom of expression.”272
The most recent case finding that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the speech was reasonably likely to cause substantial disruption
is J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District.273 In this case, a student
posted a video on YouTube274 from her home computer.275 The video displayed a group of students at a local restaurant making fun of another student.276 In utilizing the risk of substantial disruption to the school standard,
the court focused on whether there was any evidence of a history of disruptive verbal or physical altercations between the students involved in the
video, or of similar student speech causing any type of disruption to the
school environment.277 The court found that the lack of evidence of a prior
relationship between the students involved in the video did not support a
prediction that a verbal or physical confrontation was likely to occur, and
therefore rejected the school district’s argument that there was a reasonable
fear of disruption.278 In addition, the court stated that “[e]ven in the absence of specific evidence about these particular students, Defendants
could have supported their fear of a future substantial disruption with evidence that student speech similar to the YouTube video had resulted in violence or near violence at Beverly Vista in the past.”279 Because the record
was silent in this regard, the court held that there was insufficient evidence
to support the school’s decision to discipline the student.280
III. PROPOSED REFINEMENT
The current ad hoc approach to determining whether a school district can
reasonably forecast substantial disruption to the school environment has resulted in unpredictable, and therefore unfair, decisions. Because social
networking sites enable students to have wide access to information instantaneously, it will always be reasonably foreseeable that online student
speech will affect the school.

272. Id.
273. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
274. YouTube is a video sharing website on which users can upload and share videos.
See YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
275. See J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
276. Id. The student called the other student a “slut.” Id. The video also contains profanity. Id.
277. See id. at 1116.
278. See id. at 1120.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 1121.
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Judge Chagares, in his concurring opinion in Snyder, stated that “courts
need to define ‘foreseeability’ in a way that is harmonious with Tinker.”281
In The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, Kristi L. Bowman
describes how the substantial disruption test was created to give greater
protection to the student’s freedom of speech right.282 Therefore, the purpose behind leaving the standard broad was to allow for flexibility to avoid
a chilling effect on a student’s First Amendment right to free speech.283
Nevertheless, such flexibility or vagueness has in practice had the opposite
effect.284 This chilling effect likely stems from the courts’ recognition of
the school districts’ need to maintain order. A malleable interpretation of
the term “reasonable” has allowed schools to meet this need by permitting
them to act in advance of actual disruption and not requiring them to wait
and see whether the speech produces the disruptive effect.285 Therefore, I
am proposing a higher standard for student speech cases that will better filter the protected speech from speech that should not be protected because it
presents a reasonable risk of substantial disruption to the school environment.
To determine whether a forecast of substantial disruption is reasonable, a
court should consider whether the likelihood of disruption is high and the
type of disruption is one that poses great harm to the school environment.
This proposed test is based on Chief Judge Learned Hand’s formula, set
forth in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.286 In Carroll Towing, an improperly secured barge drifted away from a pier and caused damage to other boats.287 According to the Hand formula, an act is in breach of the duty
of care if the burden of taking precautions is less than the probability of the
loss, multiplied by the gravity of the loss.288
The Hand formula was applied to a First Amendment issue in Dennis v.
United States,289 a case in which defendants were convicted for conspiring
to organize the Communist party to teach and advocate the overthrow of
281. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 316 (3d Cir. 2010) (Chagares, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[C]ourts must determine when an undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance transforms into a reasonable forecast that a substantial
disruption or material interference will occur.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), reh’g en
banc granted No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 3, 2010).
282. 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129, 1163 (2009).
283. See id. at 1159-60.
284. See id. at 1162 (arguing that the vagueness of Tinker has resulted in unfair decisions).
285. See id. at 1163.
286. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
287. See id. at 170-71.
288. Id. at 173.
289. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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the United States government by force and violence, in violation of Section
3 of the Smith Act.290 When Dennis was decided, case law allowed the
government to prohibit speech that presented a “clear and present danger”
that a substantial public evil would result from such speech.291 Therefore,
the question in Dennis was whether speech inciting the Communist Party to
teach and advocate the overthrow of the United States government by force
and violence presented a clear and present danger, thus allowing the government to prohibit such speech through legislation.292 In determining
whether such speech presented a clear and present danger in Dennis, the
Court quoted Chief Judge Hand’s opinion, stating that the standard is
whether “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”293 The
Dennis Court stated that “[i]f the ingredients of the reaction are present, we
cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added.”294
While the foreseeable harm resulting from an overthrown government is
certainly more severe than disruption to the school environment, Judge
Hand’s test is nevertheless applicable to the school context. In Dennis, the
concern was about the result of speech inciting people to overthrow the
government.295 In the school context, there is a parallel fear that disallowing school officials from prohibiting certain speech will result in a substantial disruption to the school environment. Therefore, the Hand formula can
be used to determine whether the evidence supports a finding of a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption to the school environment.
Under the proposed standard, if the likelihood of disruption is low and
the type of disruption is one that poses de minimis harm to the school, then
the forecast of substantial disruption is not reasonable. Conversely, if the
type of disruption poses great harm and the likelihood of disruption is high,
the forecast of a substantial disruption is reasonable. In situations where
the type of disruption poses little harm, even if there is a significant likelihood of such harm occurring, the harm does not rise to the level of substantial disruption which would allow a school to limit a student’s First

290. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2006).
291. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”).
292. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497, 505, 508.
293. Id. at 510 (rejecting the contention that before the government may prohibit such
speech, it must wait until the plan to overthrow the government is about to be executed).
294. Id. at 511.
295. See id. at 508-09 (stating that the purpose of the prohibiting statute was to protect
the government from change by violence, revolution, and terrorism).
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Amendment right to free speech. For the cases that are too close to call,
courts should always err on the side of protecting free speech in order to
avoid any chilling effect on a student’s First Amendment right.
The difficult question arises when the type of harm is great but the likelihood of disruption is low, as in the case of a student posting a comment
on his Facebook profile that he is going to kill everyone in the school.
While death certainly poses great harm, the probability that a student will
kill everyone in the school is very low.296 Under the standard I am proposing, the forecast of substantial disruption would not be reasonable in this
situation. While it is arguable that this outrageous speech about a massive
school shooting should be prohibited, especially in the wake of other
school shootings, there must be a judicial check on the school’s ability to
infringe a student’s First Amendment right, and my proposed standard
helps ensure there is no chilling effect on this right.
Cases concerning a student-created parody profile of a school administrator will almost always fall under the low risk of substantial disruption
and de minimis harm category. While speech made over the Internet “can
reach the entire student population at any time, in school, or out of school,
which can lead to a quickly developing widespread disruption,”297 the
unique characteristics of the Internet, combined with the school’s interest in
maintaining order, do not give the school district a blank check to prohibit
speech otherwise protected under the First Amendment. First, the underlying purpose of the First Amendment is to allow uninhibited commentary on
the powers that be, including embarrassing information.298 Therefore, Layshock’s embarrassing comment about his principal, for example, is exactly
the type of speech that the First Amendment is intended to protect. Second,
a threat to the school’s interest in maintaining a safe and encouraging learning environment is nonexistent when the likelihood that the speech will
reach the school is low and the type of speech does not pose great harm to

296. See Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 309 (3d Cir. 2010) (Chagares, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the profile’s content was so ridiculous that no one could take it seriously and no one did), reh’g en banc granted No. 084138 (3d Cir. June 3, 2010). The odds that a child would die in school by homicide are no
greater than one in one million. Marisa Reddy et al., Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence
in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches, 38(2)
PSYCHOL. SCH. 157, 159 (2001), available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ntac_threat_
postpress.pdf.
297. Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering With Students’ Rights: The Need for an Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP.
U. L. REV. 129, 152 (2007).
298. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (“The dominant
purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental
suppression of embarrassing information.”).
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the school. With respect to parody profiles where the speech is likely a juvenile attempt at humor, the disruption likely to occur is a school official
simply feeling embarrassed and angered. A school official does not have
the right to prohibit speech simply because the speech embarrasses him.
Therefore, the proposed standard raises the bar on the school’s ability to
reasonably forecast substantial disruption by allowing a finding of reasonableness only when the likelihood of disruption is high and the type of disruption is great, a point at which the school’s interest is at its zenith. This
higher standard will ensure that school officials are not overstepping their
bounds in prohibiting speech protected by the First Amendment.
To better understand the appropriateness of the proposed standard, we
must carefully balance the school’s need to maintain an environment conducive to learning and the student’s right to free speech. The proper exercise of the First Amendment has been characterized as the “hallmark of citizenship in [this] country.”299 Because the classroom prepares students for
responsibility, civility, and maturity,300 it should ideally embody the free
speech rights of citizenship. According to constitutional scholar Erwin
Chemerinsky, protection of student expression should not be viewed as being “in tension with the mission of schools,” but rather as a “crucial part of
educating students about the Constitution.”301 Chemerinsky notes that, in
Tinker, Justice Fortas quoted an earlier opinion of Justice Brennan, which
stressed that freedom of speech is especially important in schools: “The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”302
Nonetheless, public schools are not traditional public fora.303 A school
has the unique duty to maintain control and protect students in the school
environment.304 The Court in Tinker found the school’s interest in preserving order so important that, by itself, it was enough to outweigh the student’s speech rights.305 Unfortunately, given the history of school shoot299. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1992).
300. See Lisa M. Pisciotta, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment Framework for
Educators who Seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 635, 669 (2000)
(“As courts attempt to draw this line in the context of student threats, they must remember
that students are still learning and consequently need to grow into their constitutional
rights.”).
301. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 532 (2000) (describing
inconsistent lower court opinions in the area of student free speech).
302. Id. at 531-32.
303. See Chandler, 978 F.2d at 527.
304. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
305. See Markey, supra note 297, at 135.
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ings, there is a reasonable possibility of such shootings occurring again and
the school needs to be able to prevent such harm before it is too late. Some
observers have gone so far as to argue that after the school shootings in Columbine, Colorado, the threat of violence is so great that the need to preserve order has increased since Tinker.306 “Web sites can be an early indication of a student’s violent inclinations” and provide a medium for
spreading beliefs “quickly to like-minded or susceptible people.”307 Nevertheless, as Judge Fisher noted in LaVine, “[j]ust as the Constitution does
not allow the police to imprison all suspicious characters, schools cannot
expel students just because they are ‘loners,’ [who] wear black and play
video games.”308 Therefore, it is not appropriate to find a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption if the type of harm poses a great risk but the
likelihood of such harm is low.
Courts are the only check on schools violating students’ First Amendment right to free speech. If the proposed test is not adopted by courts,
schools will be left unchecked in prohibiting speech with which they simply disagree, but which does not present a reasonably foreseeable risk of
substantial disruption.
For example, in Snyder, a student created a parody profile of the principal that included fictitious information about the principal’s sexuality and
illegal conduct.309 This is a prime example of a school prohibiting speech
that it simply disliked. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit, utilizing the forecast
of substantial disruption standard, found that the school did not violate the
First Amendment by suspending the student for such speech.310 Under the
proposed standard, such speech would be properly protected. The type of
disruption that would occur from such a parody profile is the principal’s
embarrassment, which is not a great harm. While it is arguable that the
principal would lose the respect of students and, therefore, be unable to
maintain order within the school, the likelihood of such a disruption is low
because a reasonable student would not find such outrageous information
to be true. Therefore, under the proposed standard, the school unreasonably forecasted substantial disruption in Snyder.

306. See generally Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243 (2001) (arguing
that fears about Internet technology and Columbine-like violence are suppressing off campus student expression).
307. Emmett v. Kent, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
308. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001).
309. See supra notes 211-233 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 211233 and accompanying text.
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An additional example of the proposed test allowing for the appropriate
outcome is Doninger.311 In that case, the type of disruption posed great
harm to the school environment because inciting others to write or call a
school official diverts the school administrators from their core educational
responsibilities, which in turn inhibits their ability to maintain order in the
school. The likelihood that such disruption would occur was high because
the act of calling or writing a school official is not illegal (unlike killing a
school official), the speech was made over the Internet (which allows for
many people to view the speech in a short period of time), and numerous
people did in fact call the school officials. Therefore, under the proposed
test, the school district reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption to the
school environment.
Many courts have addressed the issue of whether punishment for online
speech should be reserved to the parents of the student.312 The court in
Thomas discussed how the “custody, care and nurture” of the child reside
first in the parents.313 Still, courts have rejected this argument because
schools maintain authority over their students acting in loco parentis.314
During school hours, children are in the compulsory custody of the stateoperated school system where the state’s power is “custodial and tutelary,
permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised
over free adults.”315 In Snyder, the court further noted that courts have held
that in certain circumstances, “the parental right to control the upbringing
of a child must give way to a school’s ability to control curriculum and the
school environment.”316 The proposed standard only allows for school discipline in circumstances where the school’s ability to control the curriculum and school environment trumps a student’s free speech right.
It is important to note that while a school has another course of action,
namely, initiating a libel lawsuit, such a suit is not the appropriate form of
recovery for student speech cases. Libel covers only a small percentage of
the cases concerning student speech. In addition, exaggerated false statements may not always be considered assertions of fact that can be “objec-

311. See supra notes 188-210 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 304 (3d Cir. 2010),
reh’g en banc granted No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 3, 2010); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607
F.2d 1043, 1053 n.18 (2d Cir. 1979).
313. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1053 n.18.
314. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 304.
315. Id. (quoting Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 304 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
316. Id.
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tively verified” in a court of law.317 For example, the cases concerning parody profiles are narrow where it is clearly a juvenile humor attempt.318
Therefore, cases concerning a parody profile of a school official are not appropriate libel cases.
In applying the proposed refinement of the forecast of substantial disruption standard established in Tinker, courts must conduct a de novo review.
It is far too easy for a school district to claim that the likelihood and type of
disruption to the school environment are high when in fact the school might
have disciplined a student because of “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”319 In addition, the school official’s grand claim of likely substantial
disruption will occur too frequently, ruling out any reasonable argument for
deference to the school official. In addition, school officials are in a position of power over the students. They have the unique ability to punish a
person who expresses a criticism of the school board that might be embarrassing and upsetting. De novo review of the likelihood and type of disruption will ensure that school officials do not smuggle dislike of the content
of the speech under the guise of a “fear of disruption.” Under a de novo review, the court must consider the circumstances and “need not choose between dueling sets of self-serving statements regarding the existence of disruption.”320
CONCLUSION
Since Tinker, student speech has been a hotly debated issue. On one
side of the issue are students who have the right to express themselves freely in a democratic society. On the other side are school officials who need
to maintain order in the schools and an environment conducive to learning.
The result is disjointed jurisprudence in the lower courts where judges are
left with the task of balancing these competing important interests in an effort to combat any chilling effect on First Amendment rights.
Today, with the advent of the Internet and social networking sites, tackling the issue of student speech has become even more difficult. Student
speech is no longer limited to underground newspapers or graffiti on the

317. Kathleen Conn, Cyberbullying and Other Student Misuses of Technology Affecting
K-12 Public Schools: Will Public School Administrators be Held Responsible for the Consequences?, 244 W. EDUC. L. REP. 479, 484 (2009) (citing Draker v. Schrieber, 271 S.W.3d
318, 321 (Tex. App. 2008)).
318. See, e.g., Snyder, 593 F.3d at 316 (Chagares, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (stating that profile’s content was so ridiculous that no one could take it seriously).
319. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
320. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2007).
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bathroom wall. Students are now able to broadcast their criticisms of the
school establishment in a widely publicized forum. While this speech may
not necessarily take place on school grounds, its effect can very well have a
substantial effect on the school campus. Applying the Tinker standard, it
seems clear that schools can regulate student Internet speech that poses a
reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the school environment.
Nonetheless, it is imperative that the judiciary fulfills its duty to act as a
check on the schools. Courts must ensure that schools are not punishing
students simply because the school disagrees with or dislikes the student
speech, absent a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption to the school
setting. Therefore, courts should adopt the proposed test, which allows a
school to punish speech only if the likelihood of disruption is high and the
type of disruption is one that poses great harm to the school environment.
If courts do not adopt this standard, they will be allowing schools to impede on a student’s First Amendment right, a right that ensures the free
flow of information and dissemination of ideas. Education is a fundamental aspect of our society and school discipline is essential to providing an
effective education.321 Nonetheless, the protection of a student’s right to
free speech is particularly important during such an influential time in order
to foster society’s interest in the free flow of information.

321. See O’Connor, supra note 63, at 484.

